# CP – Cease NATO – BFHR 7wk

This is simply a supplement to existing Cease NATO material and NATO bad impact turns that serve as a net benefit---most of the competition and perm work is aimed at beating “perm: cease NATO coop besides plan + do plan”

Thanks to Coralynn Yang for her hard work on this file! Please email [khirn10@gmail.com](mailto:khirn10@gmail.com) with any comments or concerns.

## 1NC

### 1NC — CP: Withdraw

#### The United States federal government should cease its alliance commitment, including security cooperation, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

#### Complete, unconditional withdrawal is key — any signal of commitment makes nuclear war inevitable.

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The United States, meanwhile, is committing itself to fight — four thousand miles from home — for allies who won’t fight for each other. This state of affairs, which has become increasingly clear to both friendly and hostile onlookers, does not create security or stability. Instead, this hollow alliance invites brinksmanship, escalation, and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. Will Americans fight and die to defend Europe, when Europeans won’t? We may find out.

European collective defense should be built on a bedrock of shared sacrifice and credible deterrence. As long as the United States remains committed to defending Europe, Europe will lack the will and the means to defend itself. Nearly three decades of post–Cold War defense welfare has made Europe militarily weak and strategically unserious. American pressure for Europe to share more of the defense burden, going back to the Kennedy administration, has had little effect. Americans are increasingly fed up with this unsustainable state of affairs. Only the shock of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO can spur the European nations to commit themselves to their own collective defense.

America is made less safe by remaining in NATO. The opportunity costs of the United States’ counter-productive commitment to European security imperil real national-security interests, especially in Asia. Giving Europe a few years to get its house in order before an American pullout is a reasonable hedge against miscalculation and escalation. That prudence aside, the United States should withdraw from the alliance as quickly as possible. NATO at seventy is decades past its retirement age.

## Competition

### 2NC — AT: Perm — Bilaterally Cooperate

#### “NATO” is exclusively its institutional organization, NOT its member states.

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In contrast to national assessments, this analysis focuses on the formal institutions of the Alliance. NATO is unique among alliances in that it is not only a treaty-based agreement among member states, but also an international organization — and a highly institutionalized one at that. Since its early years, NATO has been comprised of a permanently staffed formal political headquarters supported by a network of military and civilian organizations. Particularly noteworthy is NATO’s integrated joint multinational military structure, a unique innovation without equivalent among other alliances or international organizations.

This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.

#### That excludes bilateral cooperation

Tsuruoka ’10 — Michito; Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies. October 2010; “Japan-Europe Security Cooperation: How to “Use” NATO and the EU”; *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo*, Volume 13, Issue 1; <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2011/bulletin_e2011_3.pdf>; //CYang

Second, this article focuses on cooperation with NATO and the EU; however, that by no means implies that security cooperation with individual countries such as the UK, France, and Germany is insignificant. For a long time, the majority of dialogue and cooperation between Japan and Europe in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense have been conducted under bilateral frameworks with major European countries. As a result, the accumulation of knowledge and experience in Japan with regard to cooperation with NATO and the EU remain shallow compared to bilateral relations with individual countries. Against this backdrop, this article will focus on NATO and the EU.

1. NATO’s transformation and the development of Japan–NATO cooperation: How to use NATO9

(1) NATO as a political partner

From a Japanese perspective, NATO can be seen, first, as a political partner, meaning a partner with which to have political dialogue. When visiting NTO and addressing the North Atlantic Council (NAC), both Foreign Minister Taro Aso (May 2006) and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (January 2007) spent a great deal of time talking about the security environment in Asia, including the abduction and other issues of North Korea as well as China’s military buildup.10 Abe directly requested the understanding and support of NATO members concerning Japan’s stance on the North Korean abduction and other issues. This illustrates the fact that, for Japan, dialogue with NATO is a new venue to acquire understanding and support from Europe for its position on problems related to politics and security in Asia.

With regard to political and security dialogue between Japan and Europe, in addition to traditional bilateral frameworks between Japan and major European countries like the UK, France and Germany, there is now a channel between Japan and the EU (to be discussed later). Dialogue with NATO provides a new venue for discussion. In addition to Prime Minister and ministeriallevel visits to NATO (meetings with the NATO Secretary General and the NAC) and dialogue with the NATO Secretary General during his visits to Japan, at the officials’ level there is the annual Japan –NATO High-Level Consultation. Moreover, in addition to dialogue with NATO officials —the International Staff and the International Military Staff— ad hoc meetings are held from time to time between Japanese officials and representatives of the member states’ delegations to NATO in the context of the Political Committees (PC), Policy Cooperation Groups (PCG), and other frameworks depending on the topics to be discussed, such as the security situation in East Asia, Central Asia, and missile defense. In recent years, the NAC and the Secretary General have issued statements condemning North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, which Japan appreciates a lot, showing one aspect of NATO’s value as a political partner.11 NATO is a forum suitable for Japan to discuss Asian security and other security-related issues mainly because many security experts, both civilian and military, are assembled and deal with various security problems on a daily basis.

Japan is not alone in seeing NATO as a political partner. NATO is often described as the strongest and the most successful military alliance in history and encompassing all major powers from North America and Europe. Thus, NATO inevitably carries a unique weight in international security and world politics. That weight may even be heavier than NATO itself is aware.12 In fact, demand from non-members to conduct political dialogue with NATO has been increasing. At the same time, countries that do not necessarily have positive perceptions of NATO or that do not share fundamental values with the Alliance often see the strengthening of relations between NATO and non-members with concern and suspicion. For instance, Russia and China often react with vigilance when Japan and NATO cooperate. This partly comes from their genuine concerns over the strengthening of concrete military cooperation between Japan and NATO, but it also has to do with their recognition of NATO’s political weight. Moreover, these countries view Japan–EU and Japan –NATO cooperation differently. Put simply, they react more negatively to the latter than the former. This fact demonstrates that NATO carries a distinctive profile as a political actor that differs from that of the EU.

Nevertheless, it goes without saying that NATO is a military alliance based on collective defense. NATO is not supposed to be aiming to expand its political and diplomatic influence as a political actor in international relations. This is how NATO differs from the EU, which has been trying to construct a common foreign, security, and defense policy. At the same time, however, NATO is not an alliance that concerns military affairs alone. NATO has long labeled itself a politicalmilitary alliance, and even its founding North Atlantic Treaty emphasizes political and economic cooperation among the Allies (Parties).13

(2) NATO as an operational partner

NATO today can be characterized as an “alliance in action.” In addition to large-scale operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF), NATO is currently conducting an antiterrorism operation in the Mediterranean (OAE), antipiracy measures off the coast of Somalia, and a training mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Furthermore, from March to October 2011, NATO conducted an operation over Libya. Many non-NATO countries, as well as NATO Allies, are contributing troops to those operations and missions. In the case of ISAF, for instance, in addition to all of the 28 NATO countries, a total of around 20 non-members are participating as Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCNs). The presence of non-member contributors has grown considerably in the context of ISAF over the past several years.14 In the past, Australia and New Zealand had contributed troops to NATO-led operations in the former Yugoslavia, such as in Bosnia in the 1990s. However, the current level of non-members’ involvement in NATO-led operations is truly a new phenomenon. One reason behind this is the expansion of NATO’s operational commitments beyond the capacity of its members. In other words, it is impossible for the Alliance to conduct all the operations alone as a self-sufficient entity. At the same time, as most former communist countries in Europe have already become members of the Alliance, the weight of the countries outside the Euro–Atlantic region that used to be referred to as contact countries —Japan, Australia, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, etc.— is increasing instead. From NATO’s point of view, cooperation with new partners is in essence an “import of support” 15 and NATO naturally welcomes countries with the will and capabilities to contribute to the operations that it leads.

On the other hand, operational cooperation with NATO is often an effective means for nonmembers in terms of enhancing their efforts in international peace and security, not least in the context of international peace operations. Most of these operations today are conducted multilaterally. What is more, looking at global trends in international peace operations, it is clear that the weight of United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKO) has been relatively decreasing in recent years. In its place is a growing presence of peace operations led by regional organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the African Union (AU).16 While the activities of the AU are limited to intra-regional operations on the African continent, NATO and EU operations (other than territorial defense mission by NATO) are basically assumed to take place outside of their member states.17

As a result of the expanding operational engagements of NATO and the EU outside of Europe, other countries including Japan often find themselves in a situation where they need to cooperate with NATO and the EU whether they like it or not. When the ISAF operation in Afghanistan was launched at the end of 2001, it was commanded on a half-year rotation by countries with the will and capacity to command. However, due to cost and complexities related to the establishment and maintenance of the headquarters, NATO took over command in August 2003.18 Furthermore, ISAF later expanded its area of responsibility and came to cover the whole country. As a result, those who were deploying troops in Afghanistan had no choice but to cooperate with NATO as long as they wanted to continue their engagement. Seen from a different angle, it can also be said that countries can use NATO as a framework through which to participate in international efforts. Without such a framework, small to medium-sized countries may not able to make contributions.

Nevertheless, there are various ways to pursue operational cooperation with NATO. Potential contributors could complete official procedures, including concluding a participation agreement with NATO, become a troop-contributing country, and then deploy troops under the ISAF command, or they could cooperate locally via individual arrangements made with other countries already active in the area (without having official relations with NATO).19 Theoretically, at least, it is even possible for those countries to conduct a completely independent operation on its own in Afghanistan. However, regardless of how self-contained the activities are, the necessity to coordinate on issues such as the division of roles with ISAF will of course come up, and it is practically impossible to assume that the countries that endeavor to send troops to Afghanistan could conduct its own activities without relying on the capabilities and various infrastructure of ISAF at all, including in extremis support and security information. Furthermore, even assuming it is feasible, it will not be the most efficient way to use the limited amount of resources available. In sum, it is not only in NATO’s interest, but also non-NATO troop contributors’ interest to cooperate with each other. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer succinctly pointed out that, “NATO is a framework that they [nonmembers] can use to make their own efforts more effective.” 20 Furthermore, if a country completes official procedures with NATO and takes position as an official ISAF troop contributing nation, they can participate in various levels of ISAF meetings, receive more information, and get more involved in policy-shaping.

For a number of constitutional, legal and domestic political reasons, it is very difficult for the SDF to operate under the command of NATO.21 Short of coming under NATO’s command, however, various options are conceivable for the SDF to work with NATO in the areas where it operates. At the same time, operational cooperation with NATO does not need to be limited to the military domain alone. In Afghanistan, since 2007 Japan has provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in cooperation with PRTs, and since 2009 has dispatched development experts (civilian assistance teams) to the Lithuania-led PRT in Chaghcharan, Ghor province.22 Assistance from Japan was of great value for Lithuania, a country which does not have much funding and experience in development assistance. From a Japanese point of view, the importance of this scheme comes from the fact that it enables Japan to expand the geographical reach of its development assistance beyond those areas where an Embassy or the Japanese aid agency (JICA) are already present. Without the cooperation of the Lithuania-led PRT, it is easy to imagine that Japan would not have been able to operate in a remote province like Ghor. Moreover, Japan and NATO concluded a security agreement in June 2010, which allows Japan and NATO to share classified information with each other.23 This is expected to be a foundation for deeper dialogue and practical cooperation between Japan and NATO.24

(3) NATO as another venue of cooperation with the United States

The comparative advantage that cooperation with NATO offers Japan, as opposed to bilateral cooperation with major European countries and with the EU, is the fact that the US, Japan’s only formal ally, is part of NATO. For all NATO Allies excluding the US, what NATO means is essentially an alliance with the US. When NATO was founded within the context of the Cold War, it was primarily seen as a means to secure US commitment to defend Western Europe. Moreover, for former communist nations that joined NATO after the end of the Cold War, the NATO membership was synonymous with receiving a commitment from the US for collective defense, exemplified by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. For those reasons, NATO is usually conceived in the context of policy toward the US in many countries.

**It’s entirely distinct**

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4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has described the institutional framework of NATO. Member States are represented in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the highest political organ of the Alliance. Decisions on NATO operations are taken by the Council through consensus. The Secretary General of the Alliance is responsible for steering this process of consultation and has several tools at its disposal to achieve consensus, in particular the so-called ‘silence procedure’. Consensus and the silence procedure show that NATO enjoys a degree of autonomy from its member States, as the Alliance can function even without full agreement of all of the members.

The NAC, its supporting International Staff and the civilian agencies constitute the civilian structure of the Alliance. The military structure consists of the Military Committee, supported by the International Military Staff, the two Supreme Commands and international military headquarters subordinate to them. Supreme Allied Commander Europe commands NATO operations. SACEUR has “operational command and control” over the military forces assigned to him by the Troop Contributing Nations, which could either be member States or States that are not member to NATO (Non-NATO Contributing Nations, or NNCN). Two aspects are relevant to note here. First, States that participate in NATO-led operations transfer a significant degree of control over military forces to NATO. Chapter 7 will examine in more detail whether the degree of control transferred to NATO by States equates to ‘effective control’. If NATO does have effective control over conduct of forces placed at its disposal, the conduct can be attributed to NATO. Secondly, it is relevant to note that the participation of NNCN in NATO-led operations show that NATO is a separate entity from its member States. NNCN do not take part in the decision-making process at the political level and neither have operational command and control over their forces once they are placed under the authority of SACEUR. This illustrates that NATO can act separately from its member States and enjoys a high degree of autonomy. This feature – further examined in Chapter 5 – speaks in favour of the existence of international legal personality of NATO.

### 2NC — AT: Intrinsic Perm — Exemptions Bad

#### Clarity of withdrawal is key — otherwise it’ll be a game of ‘wait-and-see’ which is the worst of BOTH worlds.

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At the beginning of the policy game, most European teams adopted a “wait-and-see” approach focused on persuading the United States to return to NATO, offering concessions that were unthinkable before (from trade to energy). The unfortunate message for transatlantic relations seems to be that a threat to abandon NATO might actually yield some results. Europeans started to take proactive steps only once the security situation in the scenario deteriorated significantly, and when it became clear that the U.S. withdrawal decision — at least in this simulation — was irreversible. Faced with a crisis in a NATO member state in the western Balkans (in the scenario, a pro-Russian coup d’état with Russian warships blocking access to the Mediterranean Sea), most teams anticipated that remaining NATO members would struggle to agree to invoke the principle of collective defense under Article 5 in this grey-zone scenario. Instead, the invocation of Article 4 — which involves only consultations in case the security or independence of a NATO member state is threatened — paired with sanctions on Russia and a robust response within ad-hoc coalitions were the preferred means of action. Without U.S. security guarantees, it seems, the credibility of Article 5 and the mutual defense commitment are questionable.

#### Complete, unconditional withdrawal is key — any signal of commitment makes nuclear war inevitable.

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The United States, meanwhile, is committing itself to fight — four thousand miles from home — for allies who won’t fight for each other. This state of affairs, which has become increasingly clear to both friendly and hostile onlookers, does not create security or stability. Instead, this hollow alliance invites brinksmanship, escalation, and miscalculation that could lead to nuclear war. Will Americans fight and die to defend Europe, when Europeans won’t? We may find out.

European collective defense should be built on a bedrock of shared sacrifice and credible deterrence. As long as the United States remains committed to defending Europe, Europe will lack the will and the means to defend itself. Nearly three decades of post–Cold War defense welfare has made Europe militarily weak and strategically unserious. American pressure for Europe to share more of the defense burden, going back to the Kennedy administration, has had little effect. Americans are increasingly fed up with this unsustainable state of affairs. Only the shock of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO can spur the European nations to commit themselves to their own collective defense.

America is made less safe by remaining in NATO. The opportunity costs of the United States’ counter-productive commitment to European security imperil real national-security interests, especially in Asia. Giving Europe a few years to get its house in order before an American pullout is a reasonable hedge against miscalculation and escalation. That prudence aside, the United States should withdraw from the alliance as quickly as possible. NATO at seventy is decades past its retirement age.

#### Empirics prove — conditions undermine European development.

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U.S. support for greater European defense efforts has always been conditional. Successive U.S. administrations have supported European moves to bolster their defense capabilities, provided that such efforts would strengthen, rather than weaken, the political cohesion of the Atlantic alliance. Those conditions were framed most prominently in 1998 by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Following a U.K.-France meeting at St. Malo, at which London and Paris declared that the EU “must have the capacity for autonomous action,” Secretary Albright penned a piece in the Financial Times stating that U.S. support for greater European efforts would be contingent on avoiding “three D’s:” discrimination against non-EU NATO members, decoupling of European and North American security, and duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its command structure. “No duplication” was neither defined nor intended to mean that Europe should not develop certain capabilities that already existed in the alliance; indeed, much of the Clinton administration’s efforts at the time, such as the NATO Defense Capability Initiative, sought to prod the Europeans into developing precisely such capabilities. This distinction has been lost on analysts who have posited that the United States has opposed any European moves to improve their capacity to act.[3]

#### As transformation is ongoing, allies will provoke Russia.

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Yet, while offering a backdoor to U.S. strategic adjustment, this second approach carries with it the aforementioned problem of allied spoilers. Facing an eroding American commitment, NATO allies on the front lines with Russia would face stark and growing incentives to force a crisis in a bid to ratchet up tensions and reverse the American withdrawal.38 This effort may not work, but the danger would exist as long as NATO's transformation was ongoing. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that it was precisely the idea that NATO after the Cold War would be a transformed alliance more political than military in nature that helped U.S. policymakers justify NATO's eastward expansion, and so helped bring about the present crisis in transatlantic credibility.39 It is therefore questionable whether policymakers, having recently decided to again treat NATO as a military vehicle, can reverse course a third time and treat NATO as a political organization at a moment when relations with Russia seemingly necessitate a military response.

### 2NC — Exemptions Bad

#### Any NATO security cooperation, no matter how small, is perceived by Russia.

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Although the United States and its allies can make every effort to send clear signals and communicate effectively with Russian leadership, there is always a risk that Russia will misinterpret U.S. and NATO actions. A variety of factors beyond the control of the deterring party — including cultural differences, cognitive biases, irrational behavior, and flawed assumptions — can cause the target state to mis-read or misjudge the actions of its adversary.99 Domestic concerns or political constraints can also color how a state perceives and reacts to the actions of its adversary. One potent example of misperception occurred in 1983, when the Russians mistook a NATO nuclear warfare exercise called “Able Archer” as a cover for an actual nuclear strike, and nearly retaliated in kind.100 Only belatedly did then-President Ronald Reagan come to the realization that

[m]any people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthink-able that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike. . . .101

This incident illustrates the importance of trying to understand how the other side will interpret one’s actions and the dangers of presuming that the adversary will share the same logic and assumptions.

Moreover, Russia tends to view any defense- or security-related actions taken by the United States or NATO in the European theater as being targeted at it, regardless of the actual intent behind these actions. As one RAND report notes,

Any actions in Europe to support American operations elsewhere have been and will be observed by a Russian military more interested in us than we are in it. It is critical that operational planning take this into account and that planners and operators take steps to prevent Russia from mistaking operations and actions as unintended “signals.”102

Of course, Russia may also make such claims about perceived U.S. and NATO “aggression” with the aim of justifying its own defense- or security-related actions. Whether rooted in genuine concern over U.S. actions or political theater, the reality is that Russia frequently does not modulate its responses based on the perceived or stated U.S. intent behind its actions, but rather reacts to transgressions of its redlines irrespective of the reason behind the violation. Nonetheless, if U.S. and NATO planners fail to account for Russian sensitivities and assumptions when deciding on courses of action, seemingly minor or irrelevant actions could inadvertently trigger escalation with Russia.

#### Aff evidence that says “it’s fine” is American stubbornness. Ukraine is a brink, not a thumper.

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Worse, Western officials typically insisted that Russia would have nothing to say about the matter. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary General, was especially blunt and arrogant on that score. He summarily rejected Moscow’s demands in late 2021 that NATO provide binding security guarantees to Russia, including a commitment that Ukraine would never be offered membership, and that NATO military forces would not be deployed in that country. Stoltenberg’s response could not have been more uncompromising. “NATO has an open‐​door policy. This is enshrined in NATO’s founding treaty … The message today to Russia is that it is for Ukraine as a sovereign nation to decide its own path. And for the 30 NATO allies to decide when Ukraine is ready to become a member.”

Western officials implicitly assumed that Russia could be intimidated and eventually compelled to accept Ukraine as part of NATO. They dismissed the Kremlin’s increasingly pointed warnings that efforts to make Kyiv an Alliance asset would cross a red line that violated Russia’s security. Their assumption that Moscow would tamely accept a NATO presence inside Russia’s core security zone proved to be spectacularly wrong, and Ukraine is now paying a very high price in treasure and blood for their miscalculation.

One might hope that NATO leaders would have learned an important lesson from such a costly mistake. However, they are stubbornly ignoring a new set of ominous warnings from Moscow, and this time, the price of such tone‐​deaf arrogance could be utterly catastrophic. Indeed, it is creating the risk of a nuclear clash between Russia and the United States. In his first speech announcing the “special military operation” in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin warned all outside parties (clearly meaning NATO members) not to interfere. “Anyone who tries to interfere with us … must know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences as you have never before experienced in your history.” [Emphasis added]

#### Russia hates the institution of NATO---withdrawal is key

Evan Kerrane 9/23/20. PhD candidate, Swansea University, UK; Major, U.S. Army. "Russian Insecurities: How Fear Drives Perception in the Near Abroad". Sciendo. 9-23-2020. https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/jobs/ahead-of-print/article-10.2478-jobs-2020-0004/article-10.2478-jobs-2020-0004.xml?language=en

Moscow has remained sceptical of the security alliance, once aimed at defending Western Europe from the Soviet Union remaining in existence following its collapse. Richard Sakwa (2016) argued that NATO’s very being is ‘justified by the need to manage the security threats provoked by its enlargement’ (4). While this commentary ignores why the former Warsaw Pact and Baltic states would perceive Moscow as a threat, it still serves to represent the alternative viewpoint, not of a benevolent NATO seeking peace and justice, but of a menacing military alliance taking over strategic territory through membership.

Furthermore, NATO is viewed as a lingering tool of U.S. dominance in Europe. For many realists, the survival of NATO following the Cold War says more about American power and influence over Europe than multilateral institutions (Waltz 2000, 20). Waltz argued, ‘that international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests’ (21). In other words, NATO survived because it was in the national interest of the United States and its expansion continues to be a policy pursued for American interests. Moscow, therefore, perceives NATO as an imperial weapon of an expansionist, unchecked U.S. power.

To this end, Russia sees NATO as a weapon against its interests and a potential threat to its survival. Russian academic Sergei Karaganov (2014) argued, ‘the West has continually sought to expand its zone of military, economic, and political influence through NATO and the EU. Russian interests and objections were flatly ignored. Russia was treated like a defeated power, though we did not see ourselves as defeated’. This perception is not isolated within Moscow. Prominent Cold War figures warned of the policy of expansion towards Russian borders. George Kennan (1997), the American diplomat and author of the original containment policy, warned that expansion of NATO would be disastrous for U.S.–Russia relations, as perception in Moscow questions the need for a military alliance following the end of hostile tensions.

Debate centred on whether the West ‘promised’ not expand into the Near Abroad continues among academics (for discussion, see Kramer 2009; Kramer and Shifrinson 2017). However, these issues are secondary to the security issues of strategic depth between Moscow and the West. Since realists argue that states pay close attention to relative gains from rivals, and since perceptions play a key role in this analysis, any perception of an advantage equates to an advantage. For Moscow, there is a perception that the admissions of former World Trade Organization (WTO) states represent these broken promises by NATO (Waltz 2000, 22). The 2008 discussion of membership to both Georgia and Ukraine signalled further ‘violations’ of this agreement, but the power gains remain the primary concern. During a March 2014 press conference, Putin expressed his frustration at the West. He said, ‘We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West’. Putin went on to say that the West repeatedly lies to Moscow, ‘This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern you”. That’s easy to say’ (Ibid.).

#### Seen as camouflage---only treaty exit solves

CNN 14. "Why Russia will never trust NATO". Graphic Online. https://www.graphic.com.gh/international/international-news/why-russia-will-never-trust-nato.html

According to the official Russian version of the call, his American counterpart assured him the alliance did not have "provocative or expansionist" intentions -- and that Russia should know this.

But it hardly seems to matter how often NATO makes these assurances. The Kremlin will never trust them. Fear of the Western military alliance's steady march east is deep-rooted. It strikes at the very heart of Russia's national sense of security, a relic of Cold War enmity which has seeped down to post-Soviet generations.

Ilya Saraev is a 15-year-old pupil at the First Moscow cadet school in Moscow. He thinks long and hard when I ask him about NATO. "I think NATO might be a friend to Russia but there's one point I don't understand: Why it needs to approach the border with Russia more and more," he says.

Cadet school is an education in patriotism, like something from a bygone era. Besides the regular classes, there are lessons in ballroom dancing. Teenage cadets proudly leading local beauties through the waltz while outside their classmates rehearse the goosestep.

After the takeover of Crimea, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry accused Russia of behaving in a 19th century fashion in the 21st century. In some ways it's an epithet that seems to ring true here. The children are immaculately mannered and thoughtful. They write to their fellow cadets in Crimea. They say they feel sad there's this tension between brother nations -- Russia and Ukraine.

"People still don't realize that war means despair and grief," says 16-year-old Vlad Voinakov. "They can't find a compromise because people's interests become involved and that's where the problem lies."

Russia and NATO have never been able to find much of a compromise. Russia's repeated stance is that after German reunification, promises were made that NATO would never expand eastward -- and were promptly broken. NATO says this is simply not true. "No such pledge was made, and no evidence to back up Russia's claims has ever been produced," the alliance wrote in an April fact sheet entitled "Russia's accusations -- setting the record straight."

NATO says it has tried hard to make Russia a "privileged partner." It has worked together with Russia on a range of issues from counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics to submarine rescue and emergency planning. NATO says that fundamentally Russia's anti-NATO rhetoric is an attempt to "divert attention away from its actions" in Ukraine. Now all cooperation is off the table.

"From the Russian side, that NATO-Russian cooperation was just a camouflage," says Vladimir Batyuk of Russian think tank, the Institute of USA and Canada Studies. "After the Cold War Russia tried several times to become a member and the Americans always said, 'it's not going to happen.'" He quotes Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, on the object of NATO's existence: "To keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."

#### Existence of NATO is a threat---“security guarantee” is code for denying SOI

per Concordiam 19. Professional journal published quarterly by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. "Review: Hybrid War in the Lands in Between". per Concordiam. 12-10-2019. https://perconcordiam.com/hybrid-war-in-the-lands-in-between/

Although the Soviet Union is dead, Orenstein explains that for a Russian government determined to win back the former Soviet empire, the very existence of NATO and its security guarantees to member states constitute a threat. An enlarged NATO alliance threatens Russia’s attempts to [re]establish itself as a great power with a legitimate sphere of influence — whether or not the lands in between acknowledge or accept that influence.

Or, to put it in more plain terms, “where the West sees democracy promotion as a strategy for promoting peace in Europe, Putin sees it as an act of war against Russia and his regime in particular. … Russia regards the battle for influence in the lands in between as a zero-sum game, to be won or lost.” This conflict of visions has led to a conflict in reality as Russia conducts hybrid war and operates in a gray area, daring Western nations to stop it.

#### The CP maintains its potential---outweighs intentions

Mitch Potterstaff 08. Reporter at The Star. "Putin questions existence of NATO". thestar. https://www.thestar.com/news/2008/04/05/putin\_questions\_existence\_of\_nato.html

BUCHAREST–Describing his two terms in power as "the resurrection of Russia," Vladimir Putin yesterday delivered a bracing broadside to the NATO summit, warning that while there is no danger of another Cold War, there is also no possibility of global security without full Russian engagement.

Addressing reporters in the wake of candid closed-door meetings with NATO heads of state, the Russian president prefaced his criticisms with an assurance that it is in nobody's interest to plunge back into the "murky waters of Cold Wars."

Such a scenario, he said, would be impossible regardless because the old "ideological differences" no longer exist.

But with the same reasoning, Putin questioned the very existence of NATO, saying the purpose of the expanding transatlantic alliance is unclear today, given that the Soviet Union it was designed to counter is a thing of the past. Instead, he said, NATO appears on a track to continue getting bigger – and nearer to Russia's borders – even when its future role lacks clarity.

"Who is NATO against?" Putin asked. "The emergence of the powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct threat to Russia's security. I heard them saying today that the expansion is not directed against Russia. But it's the potential, not intentions, that matters."

#### The counterplan ENDS NATO and any permutation LINKS --- U.S. security cooperation is what keeps NATO alive --- if the U.S. reduces its commitments to NATO it will whither and European Allies will shift to collective defense

**Shifrinson ‘21**

(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @ <https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/> //um-ef)

Although Trump has now left office, **NATO is** nonetheless **in for difficult times**, as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020, **the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other NATO members**.16 **The net result presents** two possible avenues for deeper, **substantive divides in the alliance**. First, if competition with Beijing escalates, **the** **U**nited **S**tates **may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to European affairs**. **This would invert the Cold War experience**, **creating the potential for the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere** **and NATO’s European members** **seek alternatives for their security**. Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear; **as American priorities change**, **NATO cohesion may decline** as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become possible. President Biden’s path forward Recognizing these limits, what are the options for the United States under the Biden administration? Any policy must start from a recognition that **America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success**. Great powers no longer pose threats to dominate the region’s security or deny the independence of most countries therein. China, of course, is making economic and political inroads in the area, but is also encountering increasing opposition as it overplays its hand and, in any case, does not threaten the survival or sovereignty of European states. Russia, on the other hand, has notable military capabilities that can threaten neighbors along its immediate perimeter, but it lacks the wherewithal to imperil countries much beyond that. Moreover, its force structure seems designed to raise the costs for any U.S.–led NATO operation near Russia’s own borders, just as Europe’s member states have the economic and military capacity to oppose any Russian designs. As a result, **a stable European balance of power can exist**. This is a sea-change from the postwar, or even post–Cold War periods. NATO’s original purpose has been vindicated; the victory is won. Any policy must start from a recognition that America’s postwar mission in Europe has reached a natural end-state born of overwhelming success. In addition, **the United States faces diminishing returns, and several negative results, from continuing its present approach to NATO**. The alliance has now been enlarged to the point where few strategically meaningful European actors exist outside of NATO’s orbit, even as those that exist, such as Ukraine, would constitute a net loss for U.S. national security by risking a direct conflict with Moscow. In short, little can be gained from continued expansion. **Likewise, as European leaders continue pressing for greater autonomy from the United States and NATO, the U.S. will generate increased friction with its allies if it continues to suppress their initiatives in this direction**. This tension, meanwhile, comes at a time when Europe itself is of diminishing relative importance to an American grand strategy increasingly fixed on Asia, as most of the actors involved recognize. As the U.S.–led alliance continues moving toward Russia’s borders, it may play some role in driving Moscow and Beijing to cooperate in international affairs. In short, U.S. policy in Asia complicates U.S. strategy in Europe, and vice-versa. The **United States requires a course correction**. **U.S. policy toward NATO now injects**a large degree of **instability and unsustainability into the region**, which ironically possesses the preconditions for an unprecedented degree of stability thanks in part to prior U.S. efforts. In consequence, the **Biden**administration **should**consider proceeding along four tracks, with the goal of significantly reducing the U.S. security presence via NATO. Ending enlargement In coordination with its partners, the United States should credibly renounce further NATO enlargement. Whatever one makes of the merits of America’s post–1945 presence in Europe, the gains from further enlargement are few and the risks substantial. Several pathways exist to develop a policy of ceasing enlargement. Most directly, the U.S. government could simply declare it will not support the alliance’s further growth; thanks to NATO’s “one state, one vote” procedures, this would be enough to scuttle a further expansion push. Less unilaterally, U.S. planners could attempt to craft an intra–NATO consensus that expansion is no longer worth the costs. Given that many alliance members have long been skeptical of the merits of expansion — German policymakers, for example, were famously ambivalent over the Bucharest Declaration of 2008, which embraced Ukraine’s and Georgia’s interest in NATO membership — forging a broad front on this agenda ought not be difficult. Along the way, U.S. and allied diplomats should also seek to dampen the membership aspirations of those states still outside the alliance. Cutting troop commitments Second, the U.S. government should forgo permanently stationing combat forces in the Eastern European states admitted to NATO since the Cold War. Amid mounting calls to bolster the alliance’s presence along the so-called “eastern flank” due to collapsing relations with Moscow, the U.S. government should **encourage European NATO members to bear primary responsibility for defense obligations east of the Oder–Neisse line**. Not only have NATO’s European members taken an active role in the alliance’s ongoing “Enhanced Forward Presence” in Poland and the Baltic States; there is more than enough latent military capability in the European portion of the alliance to see this task through.17 For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact (excluding Albania and the Baltic States) that have joined NATO since 1995 have nearly the same gross domestic product ($1.55 trillion, measured in 2010 dollars) as Russia ($1.76 trillion). Their population, 92 million people versus Russia’s 144 million, is also significant. Add in the other European members of NATO, and the numbers shift decisively against Russia. Although non–U.S. military investments in NATO remain underwhelming, **even limited growth** **in non–U.S. NATO defense capabilities could** thus **provide a significant force able to take the lead in Eastern Europe**. **The United States should promote this result, with the goal of shifting the defense burden in Europe to the highly capable states in the area to reduce U.S. defense obligations.**Rebalancing trans–Atlantic politics **The United States ought to prepare for a broader recalibration of political responsibilities in Europe**. Precisely because the United States has other domestic and international obligations, and because NATO’s European members are increasingly disenchanted with U.S. predominance, **conditions are ripe to empower the European allies**. The objective should be **to strengthen intra–European solidarity and cooperation while the United States** **steps back from active management of European security**. The United States should pivot toward becoming the pacifier of last resort rather than the manager of early squabbles.

### 2NC — Exemptions Bad — AI

#### Specifically, US-NATO military cooperation over AI sends an escalatory message to Russia.

Nadibaidze ’21— Anna; PhD Fellow at the Center for War Studies and the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark. Her doctoral research is supported by the AutoNorms project, funded by the European Research Council (ERC). “RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY AI, AUTOMATION, AND AUTONOMY”; Foreign Policy Research Institute, Eurasia Program; <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/012622-russia-ai-.pdf>; //CYang

International factors play a key role in the Russian reasoning. The whole security apparatus closely monitors developments in other countries, including but not limited to the U.S., China, Israel, and South Korea. In the current atmosphere of distrust between Russia and the U.S./NATO, the feeling of competition22 and a global AI or tech race may appear inescapable.23 Thus, demonstrating capabilities in AI, autonomy, and automation becomes important for sending the message that Russia is entering, or already part of, the global competition. As Vadim Kozyulin from the PIR Center think tank notes, for Russia, “combat robots have become one of the symbols of the renaissance of armed forces, a promising export product and a signal to the world of the country’s readiness to challenge the technological leadership of the United States.”24

At the same time, Russia’s pursuit of weaponized AI should not only be associated with strategic motivations. Ideology and beliefs about Russia’s state identity and its role in the world are important features of the discourse relating to AI. As Putin has said, he is convinced that Russia “must, and can, become one of the global leaders in the sphere of AI. This is a question of our future, the place of Russia in the world.”25

Technological and scientific innovation has historically been closely associated with Russia’s self-perception as a great power and quest to be recognized as such.26 As noted by Federation Council Chairwoman Valentina Matviyenko, science and technology have been key factors in the development of Russia throughout history. She quotes the scientist Mikhail Lomonosov, who said in the 17th century that, “The honor of the Russian people demands that they should show their ability and sharpness in science.”27 Mastering AI therefore comes to be perceived as continuing the trajectory of previous technological achievements presented as part of Russia’s great power status, such as space exploration and nuclear weapons.

Military technology is arguably particularly important for signaling great power status, and demonstrating military revival is closely related to Russian leadership’s quest to be taken “seriously” by other great powers in what it sees as a post-hegemonic, multipolar (or polycentric) world.28 To be recognized as part of the modern great power club, Russia believes that it must be at the forefront of AI development. As Putin argued, “it is not coincidental that many developed countries of the world have already adopted their own action plans for the development of such technologies. And we, of course, must ensure technological sovereignty in the field of AI.”29

### 2NC — Exemptions Bad — Cyber

#### Security cooperation with NATO over cyber uniquely provokes Russia.

Zhiping ’22 — Qi; observer on international affairs. April 22, 2022; "US sets dangerous precedents in cyberspace"; *Global Times*; https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202204/1260039.shtml; //CYang

In the context of a hot war, situations won’t exactly follow the US script that whether engagement in cyberspace would be considered armed engagement or whether it would provoke another nuclear weapon state to escalate the conflict. Against the backdrop of Russia’s announcement to raise its nuclear preparedness and unspecified cyberattacks on Russian nuclear facilities, US direct engagement in cyber conflict with Russia will easily lead to a strategic miscalculation. The Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the US and NATO in a statement for waging a cyber war against Russia involving a broader scale of hackers. This is a stern warning against the US’ “dangerous game” in cyberspace which would possibly trigger a conflict between nuclear-weapon states.

The second precedent the US sets is a proxy war in cyberspace. The US uses China and Russia as imaginary enemies to promote its cyber strategy of “hunt-forward” and “persistent engagement.” The US is deeply involved in building the cyber power of Ukraine, using it as a bridgehead for close reconnaissance, network penetration and cyber attacks against Russia, preparing for its cyber confrontation with Russia. Apart from Ukraine, the US is also doing the same in the Asia-Pacific region, hyping China’s cybersecurity threats to China’s neighbors and thus luring them into “cybersecurity cooperation” in an attempt to bring the US cyber tentacles to China’s doorstep. This is similar to US intention of deploying its missile and anti-missile systems in the vicinity of China and Russia, which not only enhances the US deterrence and offensive capabilities, but also takes the opportunity to force China and Russia’s neighboring countries to the US’ chariot.

The tragedy in Ukraine is a lesson to be learned. For the US, there will be a greater security dilemma with the pursuit of its own absolute security in spite of security concerns of others, or even at the cost of others’ insecurity. With good intentions to strengthen cyber security and cooperation with the US, regional countries not only failed to enhance their own security, but also put themselves in the vortex of competition between major powers, and even became cannon fodder for major power confrontation.

The third precedent has been set for non-compliance with international rules. The US clamors that cyber attacks constitute armed attacks, and pushed NATO to declare for the first time at its 2021 summit that "significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” But the US launched such cyber activities that should be defined by itself as “armed attacks” against Russia. The US underlines that all offline rules apply online as well, fabricating cyber attacks charges, accusing other countries and abusing sanctions. At the same time, the US sees the digital world as a "land beyond law," and does not hesitate to attack other countries' critical infrastructure. While advocating democracy, freedom and human rights and opposing information manipulation and disinformation, the US cut off the Internet services for Russia, blocked Russia’s voice, and spread disinformation against Russia without limits, in a bid to confuse the public. Behind these actions is the arrogance of the US and its blatant double standards for international rules.

Coincidentally, the US completely ignored the international consensus reached last year of “developing and implementing globally interoperable common rules and standards for supply chain security,” in the UNGGE report, and deliberately created closed and exclusive small circles to discuss supply chain issues for geopolitical purposes.

What the US wants has never been universally applicable international rules in cyberspace, but "domestic laws" and "rules of its small gang" to serve its own selfish interests. The “framework for responsible State behavior” which the US claimed to adhere to only holds other countries accountable, and the US itself is above international rules. Washington’s practices of disregarding international rules have severely interfered with the efforts of the international community to establish order in cyberspace, and may even lead to serious consequences of a collapsed order.

Cyberspace is a common space shared by all countries. The US should stop “playing the touch ball” in cyberspace. Instead, it is supposed to shoulder the responsibility of a major power, avoid strategic misjudgments, and earnestly maintain strategic stability among major powers and build a peaceful and secure cyberspace.

### AT: Global Times Indict

#### This is Western conflation.

Fish ’17 — Eric; journalist and author of the book China's Millennials. April 28, 2017; “China’s Angriest Newspaper Doesn’t Speak for China”; *Foreign Policy*; [https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/28/chinas-angriest-newspaper-doesnt-speak-for-china/; //CYang](https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/28/chinas-angriest-newspaper-doesnt-speak-for-china/;%20//CYang)

[TITLE]: “China’s Angriest Newspaper Doesn’t Speak for China”

But that nickname is revealing in more ways than one. By its own admission, the paper’s actual relationship with China’s levers of power is tangential at best. And while the Global Times and the Chinese government have interests that overlap, they aren’t nearly identical. Several current and former editors at the paper say business incentives drive it to be intentionally provocative whenever possible. Provocations that involve straying from the official line of the Chinese government are welcome, so long as they don’t entirely sever the illusion of a tight connection between it and the newspaper.

The newspaper owes its outsized voice in international media and politics precisely to that illusion of “official” status. On its own, the Global Times’s sensationalism (conveniently available in English) may have earned it an international audience, but not nearly the influence it currently enjoys. In his rambling interview with The Associated Press this month, U.S. President Donald Trump cited what was, most likely, the Global Times as evidence his policy was working. “You saw the editorial they had in their paper saying they cannot be allowed to have nuclear, you know, et cetera,” he stated. “People have said they’ve never seen this ever before in China.”

Western headlines regularly fail to distinguish between the Global Times and the Chinese leadership. Take the round of such stories after the election, following Trump’s promises of targeting Beijing over trade. “China warns of ‘tit for tat’ on iPhone sales if Trump starts trade war,” read one NBC headline. “China threatens to cut iPhone sales and replace Boeing with Airbus,” reported the Independent. “China warns iPhone sales could be hurt,” said Fox News. After Trump’s call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, headlines talked of China promising it would “take revenge.” In every case, it wasn’t “China” that was talking but one newspaper.

# Updates — NATO Bad

## Assurance

### 1NC — Assurance

#### Credibility of NATO is key to assurance and deterrence globally — alliance commitments spill over.

Beauchamp ’18 — Zach; senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations. June 12, 2018; “How Trump is killing America’s alliances”; *Vox*; <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7>; //CYang

Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up. America’s partners aren’t ~~stupid~~. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up.

#### Prolif causes nuclear war.

Kroenig ’15 — Matthew; Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is an expert on US national security policy and strategy, international relations theory, nuclear deterrence, arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, and counterterrorism. 2015; “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?”; *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 38, Issue 1-2; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program.

Nuclear War

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war.

To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime.

Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force.

In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent.

Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a ~~suicidal~~ nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction.

One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency.

Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

### 2NC — Credibility Theory

#### Security guarantees solve.

Bleek & Lorber ’14 — Philipp C. Bleek, Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Eric B. Lorber, Political Science PhD at Duke University, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 2014; “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation”; *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

Multivariate Analysis

We present both "core" and "fully specified" models to shed light on the relationship between security guarantees and proliferation behavior while controlling for a range of variables. Table 2 presents our core models.

Security guarantees are statistically significant and negative for all three stages of proliferation; we can be highly confident that states receiving security guarantees are less likely to explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons.

The other results are unsurprising. Economic and nuclear capacity are significantly and positively associated with all the three stages of proliferation. Conventional threat is significantly and positively linked to both exploration and pursuit, though not acquisition. The latter is puzzling, but the more fully specified model reported later, as well as almost all the additional models we ran as robustness checks, found conventional threat to be robustly and positively linked to acquisition. Nuclear threat is significantly and positively linked to exploration, but has no relationship to pursuit and acquisition, consistent with Bleek's (2010) previously reported findings employing a different model but contra conventional wisdom about "reactive proliferation" dynamics.

Prior studies have incorporated other potentially relevant variables, and the fully specified model in Table 3 includes an array of these. Despite the large number of variables, the core result on security guarantees remains robust, although as expected the large number of variables reduces statistical significance across the board.

Table 3, Fully Specified Multivariate Hazard Modeling Results, omitted.

With regard to the core control variables, economic capacity is no longer statistically significant for explore or pursue, though still significantly and positively correlated with exploration and acquisition. And dropping a few of the variables that are never significant for any stage of proliferation behavior restores the highly significant and positive relationship at the pursue stage without meaningfully affecting the results for other variables. Nuclear capacity remains significant at explore and pursue, albeit no longer at acquire. Like economic capacity, dropping a few variables that are never significant for any stage of proliferation behavior restores the statistically significant and positive correlation at the acquire stage. Conventional threat is no longer statistically significant for explore, but is highly significant for both pursue and acquire. Nuclear threat yields the same results as the core models at reduced statistical significance.

As for the new variables, sensitive nuclear assistance is statistically significant for explore but not for pursue, and, more importantly, acquire. Since states presumably seek sensitive assistance because they are interested in exploring and pursuing nuclear weapons, the relationship at the explore stage is unsurprising. The lack of relationships at the pursue and acquire stages runs contra Kroenig 's (2009b) reported findings. Civil nuclear assistance is never significant for any stage of proliferation, contra Fuhrmann (2009).

NPT ratification is significantly and negatively linked to all stages of proliferation behavior, as expected. Because most states presumably join the NPT because they do not intend to proliferate, this is unsurprising and sheds limited light on whether the NPT curbs proliferation, although it is not inconsistent with that argument. 20 The proportion of states in the international system that have ratified the NPT has no relationship to whether states engage in any stage of proliferation behavior, although given likely nonlinear effects, these results are a poor basis for dismissing the treaty 's importance.

Intuitively, major powers are more likely to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons, though no more or less likely to explore them. Regional powers are more likely to explore and acquire, but no more or less likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Democracies are neither more nor less likely to engage in any level of proliferation behavior. And neither states ' openness to the international economy, nor changes in it, have any relationship to any level of proliferation behavior, contra Solingen's (1994, 2007) arguments.

By including so many variables, we stacked the deck against reaching statistical significance on any. The continued robustness of our core results with regard to security guarantees therefore inspires confidence. For the variables testing arguments advanced by Kroenig (2009b, 20 10), Fuhrmann (2009), Solingen (1994, 2007), and with regard to the NPT and democracy, which fail to reach statistical significance, even more trimmed models, not reported here, yield little additional support.

Assessing Substantive Effects

Unlike more conventional regression approaches, magnitude cannot be directly interpreted from the coefficients in hazard analysis. We calculate hazard ratios for our core models and observe that the relationship between security guarantees and proliferation is not only statistically significant but also substantively large. States receiving security guarantees from nuclear-armed superpower allies are only 22 percent as likely to explore nuclear weapons as those who do not, 13 percent as likely to pursue them, and 15 percent as likely to acquire them in a given year, conditional on their not having done so previously.

Robustness Checks

We subjected our analysis to a variety of robustness checks, some already mentioned. Detailed results are reported in the Supplemental Appendix, and in all cases supported our findings on security guarantees unless otherwise mentioned. We substituted a rudimentary industrial capacity variable for the at least partially endogenous nuclear capability variable. We allowed all nuclear-armed states, not merely superpowers, to extend security guarantees. We extended security guarantees to the Latin American countries that had a defense pact with the United States ending in 1945. We recoded the United States-South Korean alliance relationship as a defense pact. We reran our models using a variable based on the ATOP rather than COW codings and, in this case, found that security guarantees narrowly missed statistical significance at the pursuit stage, though they were still significant and negative for both explore and acquire. We truncated our analysis to begin in 1945, the first year in which it was possible to extend nuclear security guarantees. We truncated our risk pool by dropping all country-years in which the level of economic capacity was lower than that of Pakistan in 1972, the year it initiated its nuclear weapons program. We substituted Singh and Way's (2004) dependent variable codings for ours. We reran our models using the Cox semiparametric approach rather than the Weibull one. Following Jo and Gartzke (2007), we censored the pursuit and acquisition models, so that only states that had previously explored or pursued nuclear weapons were in the risk pool for potential pursuit or acquisition. Given the small number of states that have proliferated, for a number of models this proved too restrictive for hazard analysis. For the "core" models, censoring for either prior exploration or pursuit led all independent variables except economic capacity to no longer be significant, including security guarantees. 2 1 For the "fully specified" models, censoring for prior exploration in the pursuit model yielded broadly consistent results, including on security guarantees. Censoring for prior exploration yielded broadly consistent results for the acquisition model, while censoring for prior pursuit led the model not to complete. Finally, we systematically dropped variables, one at a time, based on p values in the pursue model. Of the resulting thirty-six multivariate models, that is, twelve sets of models for each of the three stages of proliferation behavior, all robustly supported the results reported earlier with regard to security guarantees.

#### Other studies are garbage.

Bleek & Lorber ’14 — Philipp C. Bleek, Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Eric B. Lorber, Political Science PhD at Duke University, Adjunct Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 2014; “Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation”; *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Special Issue: Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

The academic literature on guarantees also has shortcomings. Some argue guarantees do not stem allied proliferation because they are incredible (Goldstein 2000), but base the conclusion on analysis of a few cases in which allies chose to proliferate. A modest but growing quantitative literature addresses the question of why states do and do not proliferate, but reaches contradictory conclusions on security guarantees (see Table 1). And none of these studies focused narrowly on guarantees — they were either "garbage can" approaches that sought to test a host of potentially relevant variables or focused on other independent variables — and therefore did not subject their security guarantee findings to robustness checks.

### 2NC — ! — Nuclear Terror

#### Nuclear terror — prolif overwhelms ‘capability’ defense.

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Nuclear Terrorism

The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57

Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59

Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.

### 2NC — ! — AT: Conventional War Turn

#### It increases the likelihood of conventional instability.

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Regional Instability

The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60

Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62

## AT: Assurance

### 1NC — AT: Assurance — Defense

#### Allies don’t believe in credibility theory.

Henry ’20 — Iain; Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. April 13, 2020; “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence”; *International Security*, Volume 44, Issue 4; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

Leaders believe that if their state abandons one ally during a crisis, then their state's other allies will expect similar disloyalty in the future. Thus, a single instance of disloyalty can damage, or even destroy, alliances with other states. Because of this belief in interdependence — that developments in one alliance will also affect other alliances — the desire to demonstrate loyalty has exercised a tremendous influence on U.S. policy. But is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case study suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the [US] United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, several allies worried that U.S. loyalty to the Republic of China increased the risk of unwanted conflict, and as the crisis persisted, these allies sought to restrain the United States and thus reduce the likelihood of war. Although U.S. leaders were reluctant to coerce the Republic of China into backing down during this territorial dispute with the People's Republic of China, other U.S. allies actively encouraged such disloyalty. These findings have significance for theories of alliance politics and international reputation, as well as contemporary alliance management.

Introduction

Do states judge their ally's behavior toward its other allies? If yes, how? Historically, decisionmakers have instinctively adopted deterrence theory's logic that a state's character is judged through displays of innate loyalty: if a state is disloyal to one ally, then this will create a reputation for disloyalty, which will cause other allies to doubt the state's reliability. Thus, disloyalty can have calamitous consequences: the aggrieved ally will punish the betrayal; other allies will suffer crises of faith; and adversaries will conclude that the state's alliances are cheap talk. The logic is that discrete alliance commitments are interdependent—that what happens in one alliance affects the expectations of other allies—and that this interdependence is underpinned by demonstrations of loyalty. President Lyndon Johnson said that if the United States were “driven from the field in Viet-nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection.”1

These convictions regularly animate contemporary debates: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser argue that if the United States were to abandon Taiwan in a conflict with China, this could deal “a fatal blow to the U.S.-Japan alliance” and might lead to South Korea “renouncing its security alliance with Washington and aligning with Beijing.”2 Aaron Friedberg writes that expecting a U.S. “back down … [and] a Chinese victory over Taiwan … to leave America's Asian alliances unscathed, is to indulge in wishful thinking of the most dangerous kind.”3 Others suggest cross-regional effects, claiming that by “retreating from the Middle East and abandoning Ukraine to Russian aggression,” President Barack Obama left “America's Asian allies … bewildered and alienated.”4 If alliance interdependence exists, and is governed by innate loyalty, then fighting for reputation is crucial, because any single alliance rift could quickly tear asunder other alliance relationships.

Some scholars, described as “reputation skeptics,” dispute this common wisdom. Skeptics argue that because “reputation is in the eye of the beholder,” the United States should never regard demonstrating loyalty as sufficient grounds for military action.5 Jonathan Mercer argues that when allies observe the United States demonstrating loyalty, they will attribute this desired behavior to situational causes and thus will not conclude that it will be loyal in future crises. In contrast, he concludes that when the United States is disloyal, this undesired behavior will be attributed to national character, but will not always cause allies to expect similar behavior in the future.6 Reputation skeptics believe that “leaders are tragically mistaken when they commit to the use of force in the expectation of long-term benefits beyond any gains in the immediate dispute.”7

### 1NC — AT: Assurance — Offense

#### The nuclear umbrella is unsustainable and fails to prevent proliferation or solve deterrence.

Walt ’21 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. March 23, 2021; "It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella"; *Foreign Policy*; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/23/its-time-to-fold-americas-nuclear-umbrella/>; //CYang

Why is this statement so intriguing? Because it shows the authors of this report recognize that Europe as a whole might be more secure if it could rely on a locally based deterrent instead of continuing to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And if that is true for the nations of Europe, then it might well be true for others. Although the report’s authors are opposed to new states joining the nuclear club (Britain and France are already members), their statement clearly implies that deterrence would be strengthened if states facing serious external threats had a nuclear guarantee that didn’t depend on Uncle Sam.

This is hardly a new issue. Since fairly early in the nuclear age, the United States has used nuclear weapons to “extend deterrence” and shield some of its allies. It sought to convince potential adversaries that the United States might use its formidable nuclear arsenal if these allies were attacked, even if the United States was not. Of course, there was always some chance that a war involving one of the United States’ allies might escalate to the nuclear level, either by accident, through inadvertence, or via deliberate decision, no matter what U.S. leaders said in advance. Even so, Washington went to considerable lengths to make its nuclear umbrella credible, partly to discourage enemies from attacking but also to convince its allies not to get nuclear weapons themselves.

Accordingly, U.S. leaders made lots of public statements linking the U.S. arsenal to its core alliance commitments, and NATO drew up various plans and doctrinal pronouncements designed to reinforce perceptions of a reliable U.S. guarantee. The United States also deployed thousands of warheads on some of its allies’ territory, along with dual-key arrangements that gave those allies some say in how, when, or if these fearsome weapons got used. Lastly, and very importantly, the United States kept trying to achieve a meaningful degree of nuclear superiority to make a possible first use of nuclear weapons to defend allies more credible. Instead of acquiring a “minimum deterrent” (i.e., retaliatory forces that could survive any possible attack and then inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor), U.S. war plans and weapons decisions always focused on trying to come out on top in the awful event of an actual nuclear war.

Why did the United States do this? In good part because convincing people you might use nuclear weapons to defend an ally isn’t easy. One might imagine a U.S. president using nuclear weapons to retaliate against a direct attack on U.S. territory or to deter the extremely unlikely prospect of a conventional invasion that threatened U.S. independence. This is the one thing nuclear weapons are good for: deterring existential threats to their possessors’ independence or autonomy. This form of deterrence (sometimes termed “basic” or “Type I”) works because the deterring side will almost certainly care more about preserving its own independence than a potential attacker is likely to care about trying to take it away. Because the balance of resolve favors the defender, even much weaker nuclear powers can deter enemies from attacking them directly. If you don’t find this argument persuasive, remember the U.S. attacked non-nuclear Iraq in 2003 and non-nuclear Libya in 2011, but it leaves nuclear-armed North Korea alone.

By contrast, deterring a conventional or a nuclear attack on an ally by threatening to go nuclear — and convincing your allies that you really mean it — is more challenging. It is one thing to threaten to use nuclear weapons to keep one’s own country from being subjugated but quite another to do so to save an ally from defeat or domination. Or, as people used to wonder back in the Cold War, would a U.S. president really risk Washington or Chicago to save Paris or Berlin? Long after they had left office, a few former U.S. officials suggested the answer was almost certainly “no.” Extended deterrence could still work because potential attackers can’t be sure about any of this, but it still isn’t as credible as deterring attacks on one’s own territory.

The solution to this conundrum — if one can call it that — is to achieve overwhelming “nuclear superiority.” If you could wipe out an adversary’s entire nuclear force in a first strike, you wouldn’t have to fear its retaliation, and using nuclear weapons to defend an ally would be much more credible. Even if a splendid first strike were not possible, perhaps you could convince a potential attacker that it will end up even worse off than you are at the end of a nuclear war to convince it not to put so much as a toe on the first rung of the escalation ladder.

Thus, the perceived need to extend deterrence is one of the reasons why the United States has long sought nuclear superiority. It’s not the only reason: A genuine first strike capability could limit damage in the event of an actual war. A few commentators have also tried to argue — not very convincingly — that superiority would enable the stronger side to coerce weaker states in crises. Chasing the holy grail of a first-strike advantage was also popular with defense contractors and parts of the armed services because it requires spending billions of dollars annually on more and more accurate weapons, more efficient and destructive warheads, improved surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and lots of other shiny objects.

Interestingly, a number of sophisticated scholars have recently claimed that technological advances have put the United States on the brink of a true first-strike capability. Perhaps in theory, but certainly not as a usable option. To see why, ask yourself what you would do if you were president and facing a serious crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary. You’ve put the armed services on alert, and there is some danger that force might be used and fighting could escalate. Suppose your military advisors and intelligence experts tell you if you order a first strike now, you can almost certainly destroy the enemy’s entire nuclear arsenal, leaving the United States unscathed and in an ideal position to resolve the dispute on favorable terms.

Being a sensible person, you’d undoubtedly ask them: “Can you guarantee that? Are you absolutely, 100 percent sure the enemy will have zero usable weapons left, and therefore, we won’t even get our hair mussed?”

“We are highly confident of success,” you are told. “But there is a slim chance that a few enemy weapons would survive and reach U.S. soil. No more than one to three.”

Even if you weren’t troubled by the moral issues involved in ordering an attack that would kill untold numbers of people (and you ought to be), would you do it? Of course you wouldn’t, because you wouldn’t want to risk losing New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, or any other major U.S. city, which is what might happen if that first strike you authorized turned out to be just a tiny bit less effective than your advisors predicted. To issue a launch order, you’d have to believe the proposed attack would work perfectly the very first time it was executed (simulations and exercises aren’t the same), almost all of the missiles and bombs that have been sitting in silos or storage facilities for years would work as designed, and the other side wouldn’t have dispersed its own forces or hidden some extra weapons in places you had failed to detect. Based on everything the United States’ knows about complex military operations and the limits of intelligence, you’d be a fool to roll the dice in this way.

One more thing: As first-strike capabilities improve, adversaries may respond by keeping forces on higher alert or adopting “launch-on-warning” procedures that increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent war. No matter what U.S. forces are capable of in theory, in short, it’s hard to see how any president would be willing to use nukes first even if the probability of “success” was extremely high. This reality casts further doubt on the whole idea of extended deterrence, insofar as it is based on the threat to deliberately escalate to the nuclear level if a key ally is in danger of being conquered.

Extending a protective umbrella over allies in Europe and Asia may have made good sense during the Cold War, both to protect them and to discourage proliferation. But the nuclear weapons environment has changed: The number of nuclear-armed states has crept upward, and several countries (India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom) are increasing the size of their own arsenals (though they remain far lower than U.S. or Russian levels). Moreover, the United States is not as tightly coupled to some of its traditional allies as it was during the Cold War, and serious rifts may continue to grow despite the Biden administration’s efforts to restore alliance solidarity and reassert U.S. leadership.

Which raises the obvious question: Does it still make sense to shield allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Using the threat of nuclear use to protect other countries is not cost- or risk-free, and it may even be more dangerous than letting some other states acquire arsenals of their own and encouraging them to rely on “Type I” deterrence provided by their own national capabilities.

This view has been advanced before — most notably by Kenneth Waltz in a controversial Adelphi Paper 40 years ago. Waltz was not advocating giving other states the bomb or arguing that the rapid spread of nuclear weapons would be desirable; his central point was that trying to prevent the slow spread of these weapons was not without costs of its own and that in some cases, as he put it, “more may be better.” The question is: Is that becoming the case today?

To be sure, folding the nuclear umbrella might well have some negative effects. It might make states long accustomed to U.S. protection question its commitment (though there’s no logical reason for them to do so if it is still in the United States’ interest to aid their defense in other ways). It could also reduce U.S. influence or leverage if certain allies were no longer as dependent on U.S. protection, though folding the umbrella would not eliminate their reliance on other elements of U.S. power. Removing the U.S. nuclear guarantee might encourage a few states to pursue nuclear arms of their own, but it is not obvious that acquisition by Japan or Germany would be a terrible outcome from a purely U.S. perspective.

Moreover, even the possibility that these states might take over responsibility for deterring attacks on their own territory could have a sobering effect on a rising China and a recalcitrant Russia. In particular, it would remind Beijing and Moscow that their own behavior will affect the strategic calculations that their neighbors make in the near future, including decisions about nuclear arms. If China doesn’t want to face more nuclear weapons states in its immediate region, for instance, then its leaders should start asking themselves what they can do to make those neighbors feel less need for additional protection. The obvious answer: Stop harassing them in various ways, drop the sharp-elbowed approach to diplomacy, stick to agreements previously reached, and do more to resolve existing disputes on a fair-minded basis.

Whatever Washington ultimately chooses to do with its nuclear umbrella, the more important task is to move beyond the tendency to see nuclear weapons as potent signs of status, indispensable tools of statecraft, or powerful sources of leverage. Nuclear weapons are extremely useful for deterring direct and all-out attacks on one’s own homeland but not much else. For that purpose, a great power doesn’t need an enormous arsenal or some hypothetical capability to “fight and win” a nuclear exchange. All it needs is a stockpile that can survive an enemy attack and be able to respond in kind. Properly concealed or protected, they don’t need to be poised and ready to strike at a moment’s notice. Fetishizing the bomb and using it to try to protect others isn’t just expensive; it may also be dangerous.

## Deterrence

### 1NC — Deterernce

#### Retrenchment is a false promise — causes global nuclear war.

Wright ’20 — Thomas; Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institution. April 2020; “The Folly of Retrenchment”; *Foreign Affairs*; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-02-10/folly-retrenchment>; //CYang

The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments.

This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at [too high a price](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/restraint-new-foundation-us-grand-strategy) — and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left — resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war.

The progressives’ view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has [invaded](https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine) two of its neighbors that are not members of NATO, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea.

The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about [nuclear proliferation](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/do-nuclear-weapons-matter): nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation.

Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim — such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France — while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and NATO. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia.

A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-of-influence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence — the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded [Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-02-15/will-china-seize-taiwan) to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law.

A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people may favor greater burden sharing, but there is no evidence that they are onboard with a withdrawal from Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted in 2019 by the [Chicago Council on Global Affairs](https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/rejecting-retreat) found, seven out of ten Americans believe that maintaining military superiority makes the United States safer, and almost three-quarters think that alliances contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 [Eurasia Group Foundation poll](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/9QHRCwpR0mHqMQmCVthSz?domain=egfound.org) found that over 60 percent of Americans want to maintain or increase defense spending. As it became apparent that China and Russia would benefit from this shift toward retrenchment, and as the United States’ democratic allies objected to its withdrawal, the domestic political backlash would grow. One result could be a prolonged foreign policy debate that would cause the United States to oscillate between retrenchment and reengagement, creating uncertainty about its commitments and thus raising the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals.

Realist and progressive retrenchers like to argue that the architects of the United States’ postwar foreign policy naively sought to remake the world in its image. But the real revisionists are those who argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical experiment of unprecedented scale in modern history. If this camp were to have its way, Europe and Asia — two stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions that form the two main pillars of the U.S.-led order — would be plunged into an era of uncertainty.

## AT: Deterrence

### 1NC — AT: Deterrence

#### Deterrence theory is wrong.

Walt ’22 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. June 2, 2022; "Will Teaching Aggressors a Lesson Deter Future Wars?"; *Foreign Policy*; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/02/will-teaching-aggressors-a-lesson-deter-future-wars/; //CYang

Arguments of this sort have been a staple of hard-line (and especially neoconservative) discourse for decades. Like the domino theory, which refuses to die no matter how often it is disproved, such claims transform the outcome of a single conflict into a struggle for the fate of the entire planet. The choice we are said to face is stark. Down one path: a revitalized liberal order led by a unified alliance of powerful, peace-loving democracies, and a future where war is rare and prosperity reigns. Down the other path: a world of rising autocracy, eroding human rights, and more war. According to this view, Ukraine must win big, or all is lost.

Framing the issue in this way stacks the deck in favor of always doing more and rejecting any sort of compromise, but is the choice as stark as hard-liners make out? Does defeating an aggressor really teach others to behave better? It would be a more benign world if this were the case, but a quick glance at the past century or so suggests otherwise.

Start with World War I. Although all the major European powers played a role in the outbreak of war, Germany was the driving force during the July Crisis of 1914. Overly fearful of rising Russian power, German leaders used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and the confrontation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as the occasion for a preventive war for hegemony in Europe. The result was four horrific years of war, a total German defeat at the hands of the Allies, the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy and its Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman allies, and the imposition of a highly punitive peace treaty.

The stark reality of Germany’s World War I defeat didn’t teach Adolf Hitler not to make his own bid for European hegemony 20 years later; indeed, the myth that Germany had been stabbed in the back and the harsh peace imposed at Versailles helped fuel the rise of Nazism and set the stage for another round of war. Nor did the carnage of the First World War teach Imperial Japan that trying to carve out its own empire in Asia was a bad idea.

The chief aggressors were also soundly punished in World War II. Japan was firebombed repeatedly, and two of its cities were destroyed by atomic bombs; Germany was occupied and subsequently divided into two separate states; and Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini both ended up dead. A clearer demonstration that “aggression does not pay” would be hard to imagine, and a good case can be made that both Germany and Japan learned that lesson well. But this lesson didn’t stop Kim Il Sung from attacking South Korea in 1950 (with Joseph Stalin’s full support) or convince various leaders elsewhere in Asia or the Middle East that going to war was always unwise.

Similarly, one might have thought the French and American experiences in Vietnam would offer a vivid and enduring reminder of the dangers of hubris and the limits of military power, not to mention the futility of trying to nation-build in a deeply divided society without a competent local partner. Yet the George W. Bush administration paid no heed to this lesson when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Mind you, it’s not just great powers that get taught harsh lessons after launching an aggressive war. Back in 1982, Argentina’s military junta decided that the British Falkland Islands (which they call the Malvinas) were theirs and decided to take the territory by force. Britain sank the flagship of the Argentine navy and successfully retook the islands, and popular protests in Argentina eventually swept the generals from power.

Iraq’s Saddam Hussein eventually suffered a similar fate. His decision to attack revolutionary Iran in 1980 led to nearly eight years of war in which hundreds of thousands of Iraqis lost their lives and Iraq’s economy cratered. Two years later, he decided to solve the economic problems the first war had created by seizing neighboring Kuwait, only to be ignominiously expelled by a U.S.-led coalition and placed under highly intrusive United Nations sanctions. Aggression didn’t pay in either case, but Saddam’s failures didn’t stop some other countries — including some prominent democracies — from starting new wars themselves.

If painful defeats really sent clear warnings to others, the Soviet and American experiences in Afghanistan and the U.S. experience in Iraq after 2003 would have taught Putin and his associates that invading Ukraine was likely to trigger a powerful nationalist reaction and encourage outside powers to do what they could to thwart his aims. Surely he knew that the United States had helped defeat the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan by supplying the mujahideen, just as Syria and Iran had each helped the Iraqi insurgents defeat the U.S. effort in Iraq. The lesson of these two conflicts seems all too obvious, but Putin seems to have convinced himself it didn’t apply to Ukraine.

Not every aggressive war ends in defeat, of course, but there seems to be no shortage of cases where aggressors were badly beaten and more than a few where the people who started the war paid a large personal price for their folly. Yet the lesson that “aggression does not pay” is typically ignored or forgotten. Why?

One reason is that the lessons of any given war aren’t always clear-cut, and reasonable people can draw different conclusions from a defeat. Was going to war a bad idea from the start, or was defeat due to poor implementation or just bad luck? The lessons from a failed war will also be discarded if policymakers believe that this time is different, and that new knowledge, new technology, a clever new strategy, or a uniquely favorable set of political circumstances will bring success this time around. One should never underestimate what elites can talk themselves into if they really want to go to war.

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A second problem — one highlighted in the work of the late scholar Robert Jervis — is that humans tend to place more weight on their own experiences than on the experiences of others. Leaders in one country may be intimately familiar with their own national history (though they have probably absorbed a self-serving version of it), but they will know and care less about what happened to other nations in similar circumstances.

And it’s easy to dismiss another country’s failure by claiming their cause was not as just, their resolve not as great, and their military not as competent as one’s own. Moreover, because decisions for war typically reflect a complex weighing of threats, opportunities, expected costs, and alternatives, what happened to another country in a wholly different conflict may not loom large in their calculations.

Furthermore, leaders who start wars are often aware that there are risks involved, and they sometimes recognize that the odds of victory are slim. Even so, they will “roll the iron dice” if they believe the alternative is even worse. To take an obvious example, Japan’s leaders in 1941 understood that the United States was vastly stronger and that attacking Pearl Harbor was a huge gamble that would probably fail. Nonetheless, they believed the alternative was bowing to U.S. pressure and giving up their quest for great-power status and Asian dominance — an outcome they regarded as infinitely worse.

The bottom line is that U.S. policymakers should not base their actions today on the belief that victory in Ukraine (or Yemen or Ethiopia or Libya) is going to tilt the arc of history decisively in the directions they favor. Nor will the outcome of today’s conflicts have much effect on how future leaders think about their own prospects when they are deciding whether to launch a war.